A user identity anonymity is an important property for roaming services. In 2011, Kang et al. proposed an improved user authentication scheme that guarantees user anonymity in wireless communications. This letter shows that Kang et al.'s improved scheme still cannot provide user anonymity as they claimed.
Introduction
In wireless communication environments, wireless roaming is rapidly becoming an important network feature because of the widespread use of mobile devices such as cellular phones or smart phones. To provide effective global roaming service for a legitimate mobile user between the home network and a visited foreign network, strong mobile user authentication measures are required. Moreover, anonymity of the mobile users should be also guaranteed to protect the privacy of mobile users.
In 2004, Zhu and Ma [1] proposed an authentication scheme with anonymity for wireless communication environments. Later, Lee et al. [2] showed several security flaws of Zhu-Ma's scheme and then improved it. However, in 2008, Wu et al. [3] showed that both Zhu-Ma's scheme and Lee et al.'s scheme still cannot provide anonymity and then proposed an improvement to preserve anonymity. Nevertheless, Zeng et al. [4] and Lee et al. [5] showed that Wu et al.'s scheme also cannot provide anonymity, respectively.
In 2011, Kang et al. [7] proposed an improved user authentication scheme based on both Wu et al.'s and Wei et al.'s schemes [3] , [6] that guarantees strong user anonymity in wireless communications. However, this letter shows that the Kang et al.'s improved scheme also cannot provide user anonymity as they claimed.
Review of Kang et al.'s Scheme
Throughout the paper, notations are employed in Table 1 phase, first phase, and second phase. In the initial phase, a mobile user MU sends his/her identity to his/her home agent HA and HA delivers a password and a smart card to MU through a secure channel. In the first phase, foreign agent FA authenticates MU and establishes a session. In the second phase, whenever MU visits FA, FA serves for MU. The detailed phases are shown in the following.
Initial Phase
When an MU registers with his/her HA, the MU's identity ID MU is submitted to the HA. After receiving ID MU from MU, HA generates PW MU , r 1 and r 2 as follows.
where N is a secret value kept by HA. HA stores ID HA , r 1 , r 2 and h(·) in the smart card of MU and then sends it with PW MU to MU through a secure channel. . FA encrypts (TCert MU ||h(x 0 ||x)) with session key k and gives (TCert MU ||h(x 0 ||x)) k to MU. Here, the session key is computed as follows.
MU's mobile device sends MU's login message {n, (h(ID
5. MU computes k and obtains TCert MU . MU also authenticates FA by computing h(x 0 ||x) with the decrypted h(x 0 ||x). Therefore, MU can be sure that it is communicating with a legal FA.
Second Phase
When MU visits FA at the i-th session, MU sends the following login message to FA.
The new i-th session key k i can be derived from the unexpired previous secret value x i−1 and the fixed secret value x as 
Conclusions
This letter demonstrated that recently published wireless authentication scheme by Kang et al. still cannot provide anonymity. Therefore, Kang et al.'s scheme did not solved the problem of user anonymity that was pointed out Zeng et al. [4] and Lee et al. [5] .
